{"id":691,"date":"2009-06-21T21:08:47","date_gmt":"2009-06-21T20:08:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog?p=691"},"modified":"2009-06-21T21:30:57","modified_gmt":"2009-06-21T20:30:57","slug":"the-art-of-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/2009\/06\/21\/the-art-of-war\/","title":{"rendered":"The Art of War"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a title=\"Sun Tzu: The Art of War by Dann Bleeker Pedersen, on Flickr\" href=\"http:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/bleekerpedersen\/3646309225\/\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/farm4.static.flickr.com\/3645\/3646309225_d21bf89f8c_m.jpg\" alt=\"Sun Tzu: The Art of War\" vspace=\"5\" hspace=5\" width=\"180\" height=\"240\" align=\"right\" \/><\/a>F\u00f8rste gang jeg h\u00f8rte om bogen &#8220;The Art of War&#8221;, var da jeg f\u00f8rste gang s\u00e5 filmen <a title=\"Wall Street hos IMDB\" href=\"http:\/\/www.imdb.com\/title\/tt0094291\/\">Wall Street<\/a> omkring 1990 (filmen er en klassiker, som alle burde se mindst en gang). I filmen bliver der refereret til bogen, som en manual til, hvordan man h\u00e5ndterer konkurrenter. Siden den gang har jeg opdaget at bogen bruges en hel masse steder, enten direkte eller indirekte. Et af de steder hvor bogen direkte bliver brugt, er i <a title=\"Star Trek TNG\" href=\"http:\/\/www.startrek.com\/startrek\/view\/series\/TNG\/\">Star Trek TNG<\/a> afsnittet\u00a0<a title=\"TNG - The Last Outpost\" href=\"http:\/\/memory-alpha.org\/en\/wiki\/The_Last_Outpost_(episode)\">The\u00a0Last Outpost<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>De forskellige omtaler af bogen f\u00f8rte til, at jeg k\u00f8bte den, mens jeg stadig gik i folkeskole. Desv\u00e6rre er bogen forsvundet i l\u00f8bet af de sidste par \u00e5r, s\u00e5 til min barsel k\u00f8bte jeg en ny udgave af bogen, som lige er blevet genl\u00e6st.<\/p>\n<p>Bogen var endnu engang en fantastisk oplevelse. Bogen best\u00e5r af en r\u00e6kke vers, der er delt i en r\u00e6kke kapitler. Det tager maksimalt et par timer at l\u00e6se selve indholdet, men hvis man t\u00e6nker lidt over de enkelte vers, s\u00e5 tager det n\u00e6rmest uendeligt med tid at l\u00e6se bogen. Selve bogen menes at v\u00e6re skrevet af <a title=\"Wikipedia om Sun Tzu\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Sun_Tzu\">Sun Tzu<\/a> ca. 500 \u00e5r f.Kr. P\u00e5 trods af at bogen s\u00e5ledes er over 2.600 \u00e5r gammel er den stadig lige relevant i dag, som den var dengang.<\/p>\n<p>Egentligt handler bogen om hvordan man skal f\u00f8re krig, men indholdet i bogen er meget bredere end det. Tolkes der lidt p\u00e5 indholdet kan det siges at d\u00e6kke over alle former for konfrontationer generelt og konkurrence i erhvervslivet mere specifikt. Ved at l\u00e6se bogen og reflektere lidt over indholdet har jeg konstant fundet indsigt i konkurrenceadf\u00e6rd. Nedenfor er de citater, som jeg ved denne genneml\u00e6sning fandt gav mest mening for mig.<\/p>\n<p>Bogen er lige s\u00e5 relevant i dag, som den dag den blev skrevet. Det kan derfor varmt anbefales at l\u00e6se bogen. Hvis man kan undv\u00e6re at have den st\u00e5ende i reolen (det kan jeg ikke), s\u00e5 kan <a title=\"Sun Tzu: The Art of War\" href=\"http:\/\/www.gutenberg.org\/etext\/132\">bogen l\u00e6ses gratis p\u00e5 nettet<\/a> da den jo er &#8220;lidt&#8221; \u00e6ldre end v\u00e6rker, der er beskyttet af ophavsret.<\/p>\n<p>Jeg er dybt fasineret af, at en bog der blev skrevet for s\u00e5 l\u00e6nge siden stadig kan v\u00e6re relevant i dag. Klart en af de bedste b\u00f8ger i min bogreol.<\/p>\n<p>\/Dann<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p><strong>Udvalgte citater fra The Art of War:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>II-3: Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.<\/p>\n<p>II-4: When the army\u00a0engages\u00a0in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice.<\/p>\n<p>II-7: For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.<\/p>\n<p>III-1: Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.<\/p>\n<p>III-4: Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy\u2019s strategy<\/p>\n<p>III-5: Next best is to disrupt his alliances.<\/p>\n<p>III-10: Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy\u2019s army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.<\/p>\n<p>III-12\u202617: Consequently, the art of using troops is these: When ten to the enemy\u2019s one, surround him; When five times his strength, attack him; If double his strength, divide him. If equally matched you may engage him. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing. And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful.<\/p>\n<p>III-24\u202633: Now there are five circumstances in which victory may be predicted: He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious. He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious. He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious. He who is prudent all lies in wait for an enemy who is not, will be victorious. He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious. It is in these five matters that the way to victory is know. Therefore I say: \u2018Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril\u2019<\/p>\n<p>IV-1\u20265: Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy\u2019s moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on one\u2019s self: the enemy\u2019s vulnerability on him. It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable. Therefore it is said that one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so. Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack.<\/p>\n<p>IV-11: And therefore the victories won by a master of war gain him neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for valor.<\/p>\n<p>V-21\u202622: Therefore a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates. He selects his men and they exploit the situation.<\/p>\n<p>VI-1\u20262: Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary. And therefore those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him.<\/p>\n<p>VI-4\u20265: When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move. Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.<\/p>\n<p>VI-13: When I wish to avoid battle I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes.<\/p>\n<p>VII-32: Do not press an enemy at bay.<\/p>\n<p>X-18\u202620: If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders to engage, he need not to do so. And therefore the general who in advancing does not seek personal fame, and in withdrawing is not concerned with avoiding punishment, but whose only purpose is to protect the people and promote the best interests of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state. Because such a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and\u00a0 they will die with him.<\/p>\n<p>X-21: If a general indulges his troops but is unable to employ them; if he loves them but cannot enforce his commands; if the troops are disorderly and he is unable to control them, they may be compared to spoiled children, and are useless.<\/p>\n<p>X-26: And therefore I say: \u2018Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>XI-29: Seed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy\u2019s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.<\/p>\n<p>XI-33: Throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee. For if prepared to die, what can they not achieve? Then officers and men together put forth their utmost efforts. In a desperate situation they fear nothing; when there is no way out they stand firm. Deep in a hostile land they are bound together, and there, where there is no alternative, they will engage the enemy in hand to hand combat.<\/p>\n<p>XI-54: Bestow rewards without respect to customary practice; publish orders without respect to precedent. Thou you may employ the entire army as you would one man.<\/p>\n<p>XI-60\u202661: The doctrine of war is to follow the enemy situation in order to decide on battle. Therefore at first be shy as a maiden. When the enemy gives you an opening be swift as a hare and he will be unable to withstand you.<\/p>\n<p>XII-15\u202616: Now to win battles and take your objectives, but to fail to exploit these achievements is ominous and may be described as \u2018wasteful delay\u2019. And therefore it is said that enlightened rules deliberated upon the plans, and good generals execute them.<\/p>\n<p>XIII-3: Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called \u2018foreknowledge\u2019 cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-691","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ikke-kategoriseret"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/pij8s-b9","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/691","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=691"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/691\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=691"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=691"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bleeker-pedersen.dk\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=691"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}